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PARAGRAPH VII OF THE AUGUST 31, 1966
LEASE AGREEMENT GRANTS THE LESSEE
A FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL RATHER
THAN AN OPTION TO RENEW AND THE
BOWENS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A LEASE
FOR AN ADDITIONAL TEN-YEAR TERM.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED
MONTHLY RENTAL FOR THE PERIOD IN
WHICH THE TENANT HELD OVER AND
THE INDEPENDENT FEE APPRAISER
WHO TESTIFIED ON BEHALF OF VALLEY
LANES HAD SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS
AND HIS APPROACH IN DETERMINING
THE FAIR MARKET LEASE VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY WAS MORE REALISTIC
AND COMPREHENSIVE.
VALLEY LANES AS THE ASSIGNEE OF
THE LANDLORD IS A CREDITOR BENEFICIARY OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN BROWN AND NELSON AND
BOWENS, INC., AND CHARLES AND
SHIRLEY BOWEN PERSONALLY GUARANTEED TO PERFORM ALL OBLIGATIONS
OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND THEREBY
EXPRESSLY INTENDED TO BENEFIT THE
LESSOR.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit involves the interpretation of the provision
of a lease dealing with renewal.

The essential dispute is

whether or not Paragraph VII of the lease grants Appellants
an option for a new ten-year term after the expiration of
the original term of the lease or merely grants Appellants
a right of first refusal.

Also at issue is the Trial Court's

basis for determining the reasonable rental value of the
property, and thus the amount due to the landlord for the
period during which the Appellants held over after the expiration of the lease.

Finally, Appellants are contesting their

personal liability for the amount of the judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Ernest
F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding.

Upon completion of the presenta-

tion of evidence and argument by both parties, memoranda were
submitted and judgment was rendered for Respondents and against
Bowens, Inc., and Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals,
in the amount of $35,000.00.

This amount was based upon the

reasonable rental value of the premises for a period of ten
months during which Appellants held over after the expiration
of the lease on August 31, 1976.

After reviewing the dis-

puted testimony of the expert witnesses, the rate of $3,500.00
per month was set by the Court, the figure being somewhere
between the disparate figures in evidence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants contend that the lease should be construed to grant Bowens, Inc. the right to a new ten-year
term at the expiration of the original lease.

Secondly,

Appellants seek reversal of the judgment against Charles and
Shirley Bowen as individuals.

Respondents submit that the

Trial Court correctly decided the issues in this case and
that, therefore, the judgment of restitution of the premises
and rental payment for the period of hold-over should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of
Appellants is only partially correct and includes irrelevant
matters as well as allegations and conclusions which are not
supported by the record.

Appellants have not complied with

the Appellate Rules of this Court which require a fair and
correct recital of the facts.
it necessary to

Therefore, Respondents find

set forth a sununary of the basic facts

which are supported by the record.
The Kearns Bowling Lanes are part of a complex including a cafe, a lounge, a game room and a bowling alley which
are located in the same building.

The facility was constructei

approximately twenty years ago on real property located at
3951 West 5400 South in Salt Lake County, Utah.

On August 31,

1966, Diamond Developments, Inc., the original purchaser of

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the property, leased the facility to Howard C. Nelson and
W. Roy Brown.

Diamond Developments, Inc. subsequently sold

the property to Manivest Corporation who assumed the role of
landlord.

The August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement (Ex. 32-D

which is also part of Ex. 1), which the Court is called upon
to construe in this action, covers the bowling alley portion
of the building, together with the lanes, pinsetters, tel-escores, spectator seats and bowlers seats installed therein.
(R.72)

Thus, the lease at issue pertains only to the bowling

alley portion of the building and the references in Appellants'
brief to the cafe and lounge are irrelevant to this suit.
They are not covered by the lease in question.

(Ex. 32-D and

Tr. 121-122)
The Lease Agreement provides for a term of ten years
with rent payable at the rate of $1,700.00 per month during
the heavy bowling season (September through April) and
$725.00 per month for the remainder of the year.

Among

other provisions, the Lease Agreement contains a paragraph
dealing with renewal which grants "to the Lessees the first
right of refusal to renew this lease."

It is the contention

of Appellants that this paragraph grants them an option to
renew for a new ten year term.
In August of 1973, Bowens, Inc. entered into an Agreement (Ex. 1-P) with Howard C. Nelson and W. Roy Brown which
provided for the purchase of the bowling alley business and
for the performance by the buyers of the obligations of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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former tenants under the August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement.
Charles

E. Bowen and Shirley M. Bowen, personally and

individually, guaranteed all of the terms and conditions of
the Purchase Agreement including the obligations of the
tenants under the original lease by signing the document "as
guarantors."

(R.73 and Tr. 111)

Shirley Bowen testified

that under this document "we bought the bowling alley business
and the remainder of their lease.

(Tr. 111)

On

August 28, 1975, a further Agreement (Ex. 2-P) was entered
into between Nelson and Brown and Bowens, Inc. which provided
for the assignment of all of the rights and obligations of
Nelson and Brown under the Lease Agreement to Bowens, Inc.
(R.

73)

Thus, the Bowens' Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P)

embraced "the sale of the business including an assignment
of the lease."

(Tr. 113-:114)

The members of the Valley Lanes group first entered
the picture in the Spring of 1976, when Glade Syme, his
wife and his two sons began discussing the possible purchase
of the bowling business from the Bowens.

The contemplated

purchase was contingent upon two conditions precedent.
First, that the Symes could obtain a loan to make the down
payment and, second, that Manivest would agree to renew and
extend the lease for an additional ten year term at an
acceptable rate.

The negotiations broke down when Manivest

made it clear that it was not interested in releasing the
bowling alley for another term, but rather wanted to sell
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the property.

(Tr. 181-182)

When the Symes were unable to

work out the terms of an extended lease they declined to
execute the written agreement which had been prepared,
stopped the loan application from being processed any further
and left the premises which they had been operating for
about six weeks on a trial basis while the details relating
to their proposed purchase from the Bowens were being worked
out.
At this point, Glade and Jeff Syme talked with two
other persons about joining together to purchase the landlord's interest in the premises, since, in declining to work
out a renewed lease with the Symes, Manivest had indicated it
wanted to sell its interest.

Charles Bowen admitted in testi-

mony that he was present and participated in negotiations with
Manivest and that he even went so far as to offer additional
collateral of his own to induce Manivest to extend the lease
and that in declining to do so they made it clear that "they
would prefer to sell it."

(Tr. 209)

As a consequence, in

April of 1976, Glade Syme, Ruben Gallegos, Jeffrey Syme and
Duane Catten entered into an agreement for the purchase of
the real property in which the bowling alley is located and,
in connection with that purchase, the interest of the landlord
under the August 31, 1966 Lease Agreement was assigned to them
from Manivest.

Shortly thereafter, the four individuals

assigned their interest in the premises to Valley Lanes Corporation, which they had formed.

(R. 73)

On April 22, 1976, Irene Warr, as counsel for the Bowens,
wrote aSponsored
letter
Manivest
Corporacion
advising
landlord
by the S.J.to
Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museumthe
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of their "desire to exercise their first right of refusal to
renew the lease on the bowling alley."

(Ex. 3-P)

The letter

was forwarded to Valley Lanes and its counsel, Tom Metos,
responded with a letter (Ex. 4-P) dated May 12, 1976, advising
Ms. Warr of the purchase of the landlord's interest by Valley
Lanes and that in view of "the change of economic conditions
since the date of the original lease" the rent payable during
any renewal period would have to be increased to $6,500.00
per month.

Contrary to Appellants' representation that these

"terms were non-negotiable"

(Brief of Appellants at 2) Para-

graph VII of the Lease Agreement provides for the resolution
of any dispute over the fair market lease value through the
hiring of appraisers by the two parties.

Additionally,

Respondents established at trial that these terms were negotiated with, and acceptable to, a third party (Tr. 166-167)
who was interested in leasing the premises.

(Ex. 7-P)

The

Bowens frankly admitted at the time of the trial that at no
time prior to the expiration of the lease did they hire an
appraiser as was required by Paragraph VII.

(R. 74 and Tr. 1421

They also failed to prove that they at any time even made a
counteroffer to the proposal by the landlord as was required
by the Lease Agreement.

(R.74)

The statement that they

"communicated an offer to pay $2,500.00 as a monthly rental"
(Brief of Appellants at 3) is based upon Exhibit 6-P which
the Court found to be lacking in foundation.

(Tr. 122-124)

Torn Metos, the attorney to whom the letter is addressed,
testified that he had neither seen the letter nor discussed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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its contents with Appellants (Tr. 160-161) and Mr. Gallegos
testified that he had never seen the letter until it was
shown to him in court.

(Tr. 257)

Consequently, the Trial

Court found that Appellants "failed to make any kind of a
tender of performance which would satisfy this condition of
the Lease Agreement."

(R. 74)

After Appellants failed to accept the proposed new lease
or to hire appraisers, the proffered new lease was withdrawn.
Having concluded that Paragraph VII constituted a "first
right of refusal", as it is characterized in the Lease Agreement, and that the landlord was in a position to withdraw the
property from being re-leased, Mr. Metos wrote a letter on
July 1, 1976, doing just that.

(Ex. 8-P and 9-P)

In that

same letter, the new owners offered $35,000.00 to purchase the
pe~sonal

property and fixtures which were not included under

the terms of the original lease.

After the expiration of

the lease on August 31, 1976, the landlord served a "Notice
to Quit"

(R. 13) on the tenants and the pending cases were

filed shortly thereafter.

After consolidation the Court

ordered that the Bowens could continue to occupy the disputed
property during the pendancy of the proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PARAGRAPH VII OF THE AUGUST 31, 1966 LEASE AGREEMENT GRANTS THE LESSEE A FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL
RATHER THAN AN OPTION TO RENEW AND THE BOWENS ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO A LEASE FOR AN ADDITIONAL TEN
YEAR TERM.
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The fundamental issue determined by the Trial Court was
whether the Bowens were entitled to renew the lease on the
bowling alley for an additional ten year period.

The inter-

pretation of the language of Paragraph VII of the Lease Agreement was critical in resolving this issue.

That paragraph

provides:
Lessors hereby give and grant to the Lessees
the first right of refusal to renew this
le-as?-- Lessee;-shali notlfy the Lessors in
writ'ing by registered mail at least ninety
(90) days prior to expiration of this lease
of lessees intention to release said premises
herein contained, otherwise Lessors shall
assume that the Lessees does (sic) not desire
to release and this lease shall terminate
on August 31, 1976.
Should Lessees desire
to release, Lessors SDall submit to Lessees
a proposed .new lease foi-aten--fl_QL~~ar -~rm Or abonifide~sic:J offert<:i_le~se_):>y __
i a Eni~=Party wi-£!1~in __Qli~_t:y-:u:o:) days of

'?at~_Q_e.q~est_f()r rel_ea_~~_been n~-

9eived by Lessor~
ShOUld the Lessee feel
the--leaseterms-unreasonable then Lessee will
hife ~- compe~ent ap12r<J._~ser to 'prace§ f_ai-r.=_~ __
-lflarket l_~se__yal~e.__ on saiQ--r5roperty. Should
Les~r --th~n~el_this---maffet-varu-e---rtoi__rea~;

-~ble--;-They wi],l ob_tai:~~...ap-££aj,~_~r
t'Q--p±a-ee a fair mark,eJ;__ vaJ_ue__on ~~d property
arn}--equipmen-t.
Should --th_~_aE£_raiscers- -a.-na
L'es'See --and Lessor 'rali-to arrive S!tame-et1ng
~:ftfie minds;-- thenffie-twoappraisei:-swrrT-4ppOI:nt- a thira appraTs_5!--E~-l_l\utll_~-1__~2_r-~~~ t,
toacta:s-- a -rer-ereeand al~'3:£_ti~s concernea
will -be--noU.Dd---oy-a-e-Tlrlding of apprars-er-s--as to
·f'at-r-lllci~-va:rue-;------c-£x.-rr-=-1s-)-----:--- ---- - / \__ (J
.
---------------------------

~~) /,_/ ( \ ,--/)

. . l-._~"-d:-~'-2

.

While there is a traditional 'rule that in coristrufng
0

ambiguous provisions relating to renewal the tenant is usually
favored,

(50 Arn. Jur. 2d,

"Landlord and Tenant", §1162),

there is no basis for doing so where, as here, neither party
to the dispute prepared the lease and there was no evidence
presented with respect to what was intended by the language
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which was employed.
P. 2d 548

Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376

(1962).

Thus, the place to begin is with the language contained
in Paragraph VII of the Lease Agreement.

The Agreement charac-

terizes the Lessee's right as a "first right of refusal" and,
in interpreting the provision, this characterization cannot be
ignored.

In Basler v. Warren, 159 F.2d 41 (1947), the Tenth

Circuit, applying Utah law to the construction of a contract,
asserted as a universal canon of construction that every word
and phrase in a contract should be given a meaning according
to its importance in the context of the contract, and stated:
Courts are not warranted in reading out of a
contract words or phrases placed there by
the contracting party unless they cannot be
rationally fitted into the scheme of agreement between the parties.
See also Vulcan Steel Corporation v. Markosian, 23 Utah 2d 287,
462 P.2d 166 (1969); Seal v. Tayco, 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d
503 (1965); Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d
160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962).

In this connection, it is signifi-

cant that the characterization appears at the beginning of the
paragraph and that there is no reference to an option anywhere
in the document.
In the case of Russell v. Park City Corporation, 548 P.2d
889

(Utah, 1976), the Court distinguised between an option and

a "right of refusal" as follows:
We note awareness that what is often called
"the right of refusal" is not the same as an
option, wherein the optionee has a definite
right to purchase, whereas, the right of
refusal has no effect until and unless the
party granting it .
. decides to sell.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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See also Chournos v. Evana Investment Co., 97 Utah 335, 93
P.2d 450 (1939); 51C C.J.S., "Landlord and Tenant", §88(3).
When the Valley Lanes group failed to receive either a
counteroffer to their proposal to

re~

ease the premises for

$6,500.00 per month (R.74) or an indication that an appraiser
had been or would be appointed,

(R.74 and Tr. 142) the deci-

sion was made by them to withdraw the property from being released.

The letter written by Mr. Metos on July 1, 1976

for~

ally conununicated the intention of the landlord to withdraw
the premises.

(Ex. 9-P)

The "first right of refusal" gave the Bowens a preferential right in the event that the landlord elected to
the property.

re~ ~ase

However, the "first right of refusal" did not

give them the power to compel the landlord to
it decided to occupy the premises itself.

ease when

re~

The July 1, 1976

letter withdrew the property, and the preemptive right of
the Bowens to an extended term thereby terminated.
Even if the Court construes Paragraph VII to grant
lessees an "option" to renew, the conclusion is inescapable
that the Bowens did not comply therewith and that they are
not in a position to ask that it be specifically performed.
It is fundamental that, in order for an optionee to be entitl~
to specific performance, he must establish that he " . . . exer·
cised the option in accordance with its terms."

Lincoln Land

& Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426
(1971).

See also I.X.L. Furniture v. Berets, 32 Utah 454,
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91 P.

279

173, 77 P.

(1907); Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah
758

(1904).

The person seeking to enforce an

option has the burden of proving that he fully performed or
tendered full performance within the applicable time period.
In other words:
The mode of exercising the option, if
specified in the contract of the parties, must
be in accordance with that prescribed by the
agreement, and the tenant cannot without the
consent of the landlord abrogate or change the
agreement.
51C C.J.S., "Landlord and Tenant", §57.
Paragraph VII of the Lease Agreement in question contains a series of steps to be taken by the parties:
1.

Lessees give notice at least 90 days prior to the
expiration of the lease of their intention to release the property.

2.

If the lessees give such notice, the lessors
shall submit, within thirty days:
(a)

terms of a proposed new lease for a tenyear term, or

(b)
3.

a bona fide offer to lease by a third party.

If the lessees feel that the new lease terms are
unreasonable, they must hire an appraiser to place
a ''fair market lease value" on the property.

4.

If the lessors disagree with the reasonableness
of the amount that the lessees' appraiser arrives
at, they can obtain their own appraisal.

5.

If the parties and their appraisers can't agree,
then a third appraiser will be appointed to act as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a referee.
6.

The parties agree to be bound by the findings of
the appraisers as to the fair market lease value.

There is no question from the evidence that steps one and two
were properly taken and it was up to the Bowens to take the
next step.

They had an obligation, within the period of the

original lease, to come back with a formal offer to enter
into a new lease based upon an appraisal. 1
putably failed to do.

(R.74 and Tr. 142)

This they indisNor did they

tender performance of this condition pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, §78-27-1 (1953).
Under these circumstances the following rule is clearly
applicable:
The failure or inability or refusal to carry
out the terms of the contract at the time
when performance is due will ordinarily be
grounds for refusing specific performance,
since specific performance will not generally
be decreed in favor of a party who has himself been in default.
71 Am. Jur. 2d, "Specific Performance", §60.

In view of the

foregoing, the Trial Court's restitution of the premises to
the landlord should be upheld.

1.

Respondents do not contest the major thrust of Point III
in Appellants' Brief. That is, the appointment of app~!~
as provided by Paragraph VII of the lease was intended ~
resolve a grievance presently in existence and therefore
does not run afoul of Barnhart v. Civil Service Employ~
Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P. 2d 873 (1965).
Respondents de
maintain that the failure to hire an appraiser, as required by the Lease Agreement, is grounds for denial of_
specific performance.
See 50 Am. Jur. 2d, "Landlord ar.~
Tenant", §1167.
-12-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED MONTHLY RENTAL
FOR THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE TENANT HELD OVER
AND THE INDEPENDENT FEE APPRAISER WHO TESTIFIED
ON BEHALF OF VALLEY LANES HAD SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS AND HIS APPROACH IN DETERMINING THE FAIR
MARKET LEASE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WAS MORE
REALISTIC AND COMPREHENSIVE.
Appellants do not dispute the right on the part of the
landlord to recover a reasonable rental based on the Bowens'
use and occupancy of the premises for a ten month period beginning on September 1, 1976 and continuing through the course
of the trial.

As Appellants held over pursuant to a court

order, treble damages under Utah Code Annotated, §78-36-10
(1953) were held by the Trial Court to be inappropriate.

The

remaining options are either to base such an award upon the
rental provided for under the Lease Agreement or the rental
figures supplied by one or the other of the appraisers who
testified at the trial.
While there is some latitude in determining what is a
reasonable award for hold-overs,

(see, e.g., 49 Am. Jur. 2d

"Landlord and Tenant", §1124-1129) this Court has held that
when the tenant refused to vacate:
The court properly awarded plaintiffs possession of the property, and damages for the
time defendant remained in possession. Damages
recoverable under such circumstances are generally the reasonable rental value of the premises.
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Pingree v. Continental Group Of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317
(Utah, 1976); Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain
Theatres, 560 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1977).

In considering the quos-

tion of damages more particularly this Court has held:
The plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer. Clearly the
loss of the value of the use and occupation of
the premises, or the rental value thereof, during
the period when the premises were unlawfully
withheld from plaintiff, is
. damage suffered.
While damages may not be restricted
to the rental value and may include more, yet
the rental value during the unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of damages.
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930)
added).

(emphasis

It is clear from this case that at a bare minimum

Respondents are entitled to the amount of rent provided under
the Lease Agreement.

To be specific, Respondents are entitled

to at least $1,700.00 per month for eight months (September
through April) and $725.00 for two months (May and June) or a
total of $15,050.00.

It is obvious that this sum represents

a minimum and is well below what would be a "reasonable rental
value."

If for no

other reason than it represents the

rental reserved over a decade ago, the Court should base the
award upon the expert testimony of the appraisers.
After reviewing the disputed testimony of the experts,
the Trial Court awarded Respondents $3,500.00 per month for
the period during which the Bowens held over.

The basis for

determining this figure was the expert testimony of appraisers
for each party.

Mr. John C. Brown, the independent fee appr:::c

-14-
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who testified on behalf of Valley Lanes, found the fair
market value of the premises to be $3,800.00 per month in
its condition at the time of trial.

(Tr. 272)

He placed an

alternative value of $5,700.00 per month on the property if
new pin-setters were installed and a few other basic repairs
were made.

(Tr. 272)

As the Bowens were perfectly aware of

the critical need for new pin-setters and had, in fact, negotiated with Manivest and put down earnest money in contemplation of replacing the dilapidated equipment in order to retain
the league bowlers, any realistic evaluation of the reasonable
rental value could easily have been based upon the higher
figure.

The costs of a lessee's mismanagement should not be

borne by the landlord.

In fairness, the rental value ought

to be based upon the highest and best use of the property.
The Trial Court also considered the testimony of the
Bowens' appraiser, Mr. Zakis, who concluded that based solely
upon a cost approach the premises would only support a monthly
rental of $1,800.00.

(Tr. 297)

The essential problem with

this cost approach is that it only reflects what the Bowens
were able to produce and not what the property is objectively
worth.

We respectfully submit that the testimony of John C.

Brown with respect to the fair market value is entitled to
greater weight for a variety of reasons.

His qualifications

and experience as an independent fee appraiser are substantially
better than those of Appellants' witness.
Tr. 296-297)

(Tr. 259-261 and

Mr. Brown has also had recent experience in
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evaluating bowling alleys.

(Tr. 264)

His analysis included

several different approaches, including the "income" approach
and the "economic return" approach.

(Tr. 266-267)

By con-

trast, Mr. Zakis' analysis was limited to the "cost" approach.
(Tr. 298)

This approach considers only the value of the under-

lying property, the cost of reproducing the facilities and the
element of depreciation.

It does not consider in any way the

amount of income that the property is likely to generate or a
comparison with the income generated by other, similar
properties.
In a chapter dealing with the "Appraisal of Bowling
Centers" by Thomas R. Coates in the Encyclopedia of Real
Appraising,

Esta~

(ed. by Edith J. Friedman, Prentice-Hall, 1968)

there appears the following comment about the "income" approad
used by Valley Lanes' expert:
The appraiser must depend almost entirely on
the Income Approach in estimating the value
of a modern bowling center to the operator
because of two special characteristics:
1. The value of used bowling equipment is
completely dependent on the income it
will produce in the building in which
it is located, since there is very
little market at present for such equipment.
2. The modern bowling building is of
special design and does not lend itself readily to conversion for other
uses.
The refurbished rental value of $5, 700.00 which Mr. Bro·."
testified the property could produce is also based upon an
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income per number of games bowled approach.

And, this rental

figure is predicated upon a very conservative estimate of the
business potential when compared to other bowling businesses
similarly situated.

(Tr. 267-268)

There was ample evidentiary support for the Trial Court's
decision that $3,500.00 per month represented a realistic
rental for the period of the hold-over.

The judgment for

Respondents which was based thereon should not be diminished
on appeal.
POINT III
VALLEY LANES AS THE ASSIGNEE OF THE LANDLORD
IS A CREDITOR BENEFICIARY OF THE PURCHASE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROWN AND NELSON AND BOWENS,
INC. , AND CHARLES AND SHIRLEY BOWEN PERSONl\LLY
GUARANTEED TO PERFORM ALL OBLIGATIONS OF THE
LEASE AGREEMENT AND THEREBY EXPRESSLY INTENDED
TO BENEFIT THE LESSOR.
The Appellants contend that the Trial Court's judgment
against Charles and Shirley Bowen, as individuals, is without
basis and should not be upheld.

However, the relationship

between the parties and the documents in evidence clearly
support the Court's finding that the Bowens "personally guaranteed all of the terms and conditions of the purchase agreement,
including the obligations of the tenants under the August 31,
1966 Lease Agreement."

(R.73)

The following diagram will aid

the Court in visualizing the relationship between the parties:
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LAIWLORD (Lessor)

TEN.l\NT (Lessee)

Diamond Developments, Inc.
(2) Assignment

. l

& Brown
(3) 1973 Purchase
Agreement

----------~Nelson

(1) August 31,
1966 Lease
Agreement

Manivest, Inc.
(4)
Assignment

l

Bowens, Inc.

1

Respondents (Valley Lanes)
Respondents are the successors in interest to Manivest
and Manivest was the owner and lessor of the property when
Nelson and Brown entered into the 1973 Purchase Agreement
(Ex. 1-P) with the Bowens.

Respondents submit that they are

creditor beneficiaries of that agreement by reason of the assic 1
I

ment from Manivest since the agreement was specifically
to benefit Manivest as a lessor.
Paragraph 9 of the Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P) is
entitled "Existing Lease" and it provides:
Buyer acknowledges and understands that the
land, building and fixed equipment presently
used by Kearns Bowling Lanes is owned by
MANIVEST, INC. and the right to use the same
is subject to that certain Lease Agreement
dated the 31st day of August, 1966, by and
between DIAMONDS DEVELOPMENT, IUC., a Utah
corporation, and ERNEST C. PASARRIS and
W. HOWARD MAYES, as Lessors, and HOWARD C.
NELSON and W. ROY BROWN of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, as Lessees, which Lease Agreement is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "E".
Buyer agrees to faithfully perform all terms,
covenants and conditions of said Lease and
any amendments, modifications and addendums
to said Lease.
In this connection Buyer
agrees to provide Sellers at a place designated in writing by Sellers with a cashier's

-18-
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inten~

check for the payments required to be made
under the said Lease Agreement to the above
said Lessors, or their assigns, not later
than the first day of each and every month
during the term of the said Lease commencing
with the first day of September, 1973.
It
being the understanding that Sellers will
then transmit the said lease payments to the
Lessors.
(emphasis added)
Under Utah law, this Purchase Agreement is an effective
assignment and not a mere sublease because a "sublease for the
whole term is in law an assignment

." even though "rent

and a right of re-entry for nonpayment are reserved, or even
though it is called a sublease."
Corporation, 507 P.2d 713,

Jensen v. O.K. Investment

(Utah, 1973).

As a consequence,

the subsequent assignment (Ex. 2-P) was merely redundant and
as of the date of the Purchase Agreement, Manivest and Bowens,
Inc. were in the relationship of landlord and tenant.

As the

Court put it in Jensen:
Where the instrument creates an assignment
and not a sublease the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the lessor
and the assignee and their rights, inter se
are determined accordingly.
Id. at 716.

There can be no question that one of a landlord's

rights is to enforce covenants contained in the lease because
he is both in privity of contract and privity of estate with
the tenant.

Therefore, the lessor is clearly in a position

to enforce the Purchase Agreement between Nelson and Brown
and the Bowens because the Bowens agreed to "faithfully perform
all terms, covenants and conditions of said Lease and any

-19-
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amendments, modifications and addendums to said Lease."

(Ex.

1-P Paragraph 9)
Additionally, there can be no question that Manivest anc
Valley Lanes as their succesor are creditor beneficiaries of
the Purchase Agreement.

Section 133 of the Restatement of Cor.-,

tracts provides:
Where performance of a promise in a contract
will benefit a person other than the promisee,
that person is .
a creditor beneficiary if
no purpose to oake a gift appears from the
terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary.
It is clear that under the Purchase Agreement the Bowens promiJ
to perform their obligations as Lessees and successors in inter~
to the original Lease Agreement.
under the lease.

And rent is a clear obligatkj

(Ex. 32-D page 1)

The performance of their

promise to pay rent is clearly a satisfaction of an "actual
duty" which will benefit the lessor.
In adopting this section of the Restatement of Contracts
this Court has stated that if:
The promissee's expressed intent is that some
third party shall receive the performance in
satisfaction and discharge of some actual or
supposed duty or liability of the promisee
the third party is a creditor beneficiary.
(emphasis added)
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968'
See also, Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938).
Appellants have cited various cases from other jurisdictions
to the effect that the contract must evidence an intent to
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benefit a third party before the third party will be in a
position to enforce it.
law.

This is a correct statement of the

In this case, however, there is abundant evidence of

such an intent.
The Purchase Agreement specifically names Manivest and
further provides that the buyer agrees to faithfully perform
all terms of the Lease Agreement.
intent is hard to imagine.

A more specifically expressed

And there can be no question that

this intent extends to Valley Lanes because the Lease Agreement provides in Paragraph XIV (Ex. 32-D page 7) that:
The terms and conditions hereof shall inure
to and be binding upon the heirs, assigns
and personal representatives of the parties
hereto.
And the Purchase Agreement (Ex. 1-P) provides in Paragraph 21,
which is entitled "Executors and Assigns", that:
[i]t is understood that the stipulations
aforesaid are to apply and bind the heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and
assigns of the respective parties hereto.
Respondents submit that if both agreements by their terms run
to assigns then there can be no question that there is an express
intent on the face of the contracts to benefit future assignees
of the lessor.

The fact that Valley Lanes is not specifically

named in the agreements or that the contract is not exclusively
for its benefit as a third party should not prevent it from

-21-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

enforcing a duty owing to it as Lessor. 2
Turning finally to the Bowens' personal guarantee, it
should be noted that Paragraph 7 of the Purchase Agreement requires them to pay "all bills and expenses of operation."
in a similar context involving a guarantee the Colorado
Court has held that "monthly payment of .

"covenants to pay rent

Supre~

rent .

a liability present in its course of business

Anc

was

" and that

. run with the land, and that an

assignee of a lease who accepts it is liable on the covenants."
Shaffer v. George, 64 Colo. 47, 171 P. 881 (1918).

This Court

has held in the context of a guarantee on a note that the
guarantee follows the note and may be enforced by any one
entitled to collect it.

See First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 38

Utah 516, 114 P. 529 (1911).

In that same case the Court

stated that:
[i]t is not necessary, in order that the
guarantee should be binding upon the guarantor, that the debtor should have knowledge
of the transaction, or be in any way a
party thereto.
The reason for the rule is
that privity of contract between debtor and
the guarantor is not required.

2.

See Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co. 10 Cal. 2d
232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937), in which the California Supre~'
Court held that the lessor has a right of action as a
creditor beneficiary against an assignee of a lease who
agreed with the original lessee to assume the original
lease even though the lessor was not a party to the contract of assumption, and the contract was not exclusive!:
for his benefit.
The Court reasoned that such a resultjustified when "it is recognized that in contracts of th',
creditor beneficiary type the main purpose of the prom 1 ~
is not to confer a benefit on the third party bencfic1J:
but to secure the discharge of his debt or performance '
his duty to the third party."
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I
I

Id. at 531.

Similarly, in the context of a guarantee on a

mortgage this Court has held that where the guarantee "was
given to secure the performance of the terms and conditions
of the contract assigned to the (plaintiff]

[t]his was

an absolute guarantee and upon the default of the third
parties the [defendants] became liable to perform in their
steads.

Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111, 378 P.2d

355 (1963).

This case is analogous in principle to the

position of the Bowens.

While the Purchase Agreement was

signed by Bowens, Inc., Charles and Shirley Bowen, who are
the principals of that family held corporation, also signed
as personal guarantors to insure the performance of their
corporation.

The lessor would never have consented to the

assignment to a corporation with insufficient assets to
insure payment of the rent and thus the personal guarantee
was required.

There is no reason not to enforce that guaran-

tee in favor of the lessor as the parties clearly intended.
To do otherwise would be to allow the Bowens to hide behind a
family corporation and thereby avoid the personal obligations
which they specifically assumed.
CONCLUSION
The appeal of the Bowens must fail.

The District Court,

upon receipt of all the evidence, found no basis to support
Appellants' bald assertions of bad faith or inequitable dealings.

Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the Bowens are

not entitled to an additional ten-year term both because the
lease does not grant them such an option and because they
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regarding renewal.

Having held over after the expiration of

the lease, the Bowens are required to pay a reasonable rental
for the use and occupation of the premises.

Based upon expert

testimony, the Trial Court set a rental figure for the holdover period which is fair and equitable and strikes a balance
between the disputed testimony placed in evidence.

Finally,

the performance of this obligation was personally guaranteed
by the Bowens, as individuals.

That guarantee was clearly

intended to benefit the lessor and to insure the performance
of the Bowens' obligations under the Lease Agreement.

Conse-

quently, Respondents stand in the position of a bona fide
party beneficiary to whom a duty is owing which this Court
should uphold upon appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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PHILIP C. PUGSLEY
J
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief
of Respondents were served upon John C. Green, 430 Judge
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by hand delivery this
28thday of July, 1978.
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